

Principal Deputy Director, and others. (I've asked for a full attendance list, but I don't know if the organizers actually have one or are willing to share it.)

1. Just a general note. A clear *leitmotif* from the USG participants was that China is engaged in a "whole-of-government" or "whole-of-society" effort to achieve scientific and technological preeminence in the world, through means both licit and illicit. The USG is in the process of formulating a similarly broad counter-strategy that will include and impact industry and academia alike. The concerns are genuine and bi-partisan (in other words, not just a function of the current political atmosphere).
2. FBI analysts shared a presentation about the somewhat prestigious and generally lawful "Talent Programs" operated by the government of China-- in simplest terms, astonishingly well-funded recruiting efforts meant to attract STEM know-how (of both Chinese expats and non-Chinese scientists). It's an area of considerable concern to personnel in the Executive Branch and in Congress. There's been some preliminary talk of somehow requiring researchers in the US to report/disclose Talent Program affiliations to federal funding agencies, and I expect that talk to continue. A complicated, nebulous, and hot topic. (My understanding is that other countries operate analogous programs, but the discussion on Monday was Sinocentric.)
3. Another FBI presenter talked about the potential risks of partnering with Chinese companies, especially Huawei, which many in the US law enforcement/intelligence community consider essentially a government-run enterprise that cannot be trusted to place customer privacy above its obligations to Beijing. No specific recommendations or instructions; more of a cautionary briefing.
4. To test ways of addressing concerns about foreign influence/participation in sensitive research, DoD may roll out short-term "pilot programs" (for instance, Talent Program reporting, or reporting non-US personnel participation in DoD grants).
5. There was a brief discussion of NSF and NIH expectations with regard to reporting sources of foreign support for faculty, and some of the uncertainty or confusion about those expectations. Again, no firm or specific resolution emerged; just a group acknowledgement that this was an issue in need of further work.
6. The meeting ended with a commitment to craft a working roadmap for the ASCE group, with provisional milestones. General topics that are likely serve as early targets include (a) developing a clearer picture of the benefits to the US of basic science and foreign participation, so the risks aren't simply evaluated in a vacuum (a recommendation from Dr. Nair), (b)